A Purely HTTPS-Based, Post-Quantum, Zero-Knowledge Electronic Mail Protocol replacing legacy SMTP, IMAP, POP3, DKIM, and DMARC with signed, end-to-end encrypted JSON envelopes.
Eliminates legacy mail ports (25, 110, 143, 993). Zero extra daemons.
X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation and Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures.
Servers store ciphertext only. Content & display headers sealed client-side.
Key transparency log with witness quorum co-signatures to prevent split-view attacks.
EVH mandates clean separation between sender authorization (Hop 1) and server-to-server domain authentication (Hop 2), eliminating credential leakage and enabling domain reputation tracking.
E2EE Encrypt & Hybrid Sign
WebAuthn PRFHTTPS + Bearer Token
POST /evh/v3/submit
Submission Domain Server
Queue & OutboundRFC 9421 Domain Sig
POST /evh/v3/deliver
Recipient Domain Server
Sync / SSE Push
A single HTTPS listener on port 443 can host both a public website and an EVH service by routing distinct URL prefixes under /.well-known/evh and /evh/v3/*.
To allow custom GUI branding without exposing clients to tracking vectors or XSS attacks, EVH mandates strict server logo requirements:
logo.sha256 before rendering.
<script>, <foreignObject>, or event handlers.
default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob:.
EVH combines classical high-speed algorithms with post-quantum lattice primitives (NIST FIPS 203 & 204) to assure long-term confidentiality against quantum adversaries.
| Cryptographic Function | Algorithm Selected | Parameters & Standard Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Key Encapsulation (KEM) | Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 | Ephemeral X25519 (RFC 7748) + single-use ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) |
| Key Derivation (KDF) | HKDF-SHA-256 | Extract-then-Expand with transcript salt (RFC 5869) |
| Authenticated Encryption | AES-256-GCM | 256-bit key, 96-bit derived nonce, 128-bit tag (NIST SP 800-38D) |
| Account & Device Signatures | Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 | Both signature halves required (RFC 8032; NIST FIPS 204) |
| Domain HTTP Signatures | Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 | RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures & RFC 9530 Digest Fields |
EVH strictly isolates the offline 256-bit recovery seed from device-local signing keys. Hardware authenticators or Secure Enclaves execute operations without exposing seed material.
│
└──► Root Identity Key Pair (id_ed25519 + id_mldsa65)
├── Signs Device Certificates: (device_id, dev_pub, expires_ms)
└── Signs Prekey Batches: (kex_x25519, prekey[i]_mlkem768)
Let LP(x) denote the 4-byte length prefix of x concatenated with x. Sender encapsulates against the recipient's prekey:
To defeat social-graph traffic fingerprinting, EVH applies zero-byte padding out to the nearest power-of-two bucket boundary starting at 4 KiB (4 KiB, 8 KiB, 16 KiB ... 1 MiB).
Attachments are encrypted client-side with AES-256-GCM using a random file key k_blob before uploading to POST /evh/v3/blob.
Zero Cross-Tenant Correlation: Because the server storage key is derived with the user's secret account_blob_salt, two users uploading the exact same document generate completely uncorrelated storage IDs.
Section 3.3 Endpoint Registry. All messages carry "v": 3, enforce JCS JSON canonicalization, and execute strictly over HTTPS.
| Method | Endpoint Path | Authentication Required | Purpose & Scope |
|---|
DNSSEC validation is REQUIRED. Unsecured domains trigger a mandatory "DNS Not Secured" warning in client GUIs.
_evh._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN SRV 0 1 443 evh.example.com. _evh.example.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=evh3; endpoint=https://evh.example.com; keylog=https://log.evhmail.com; policy=https://example.com/mail-policy"
{
"v": 3,
"domain": "example.com",
"endpoint": "https://evh.example.com",
"logo": {
"url": "https://evh.example.com/.well-known/evh/logo",
"sha256": "9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08",
"format": "image/svg+xml"
}
}
Section 10.1 Order of Execution. The RDS validates incoming envelopes in exact sequence and halts immediately at the first failure to conserve computational resources.
Signed Tree Heads (STHs) MUST be co-signed by at least 3 out of 5 independent witness nodes to prevent split-view attacks by malicious operators.
Devices offline beyond 72 hours enter Restricted Read-Only State and display an explicit "Unverified Log State" warning before accepting new key bindings.
Rolling Cuckoo filter backed by memory-mapped snapshots and Write-Ahead Log (WAL) enables millisecond restarts without 503 delivery outages.
Section 2.1 Protected Assets & Adversary Capabilities.
TLS 1.3 transport; end-to-end encrypted payloads and attachment blobs with mandatory power-of-two padding (4 KiB to 1 MiB).
Strict TLS certificate validation; device signatures; AAD binding in AES-GCM transcript; rolling Cuckoo replay filter.
Zero-knowledge ciphertext storage; Merkle key transparency log with independent witness gossip verification.
Client-side encryption and signing; client-encrypted sent copies prevent relay tampering or header injection.
Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) KEM and hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) device and domain signatures.
Server holds ciphertext and routing metadata only; cannot surrender plaintext or user private key material.
EVH explicitly does not protect against malware on compromised endpoint devices, provider-controlled webmail origins sharing an API domain, fine-grained routing metadata observed by network transit nodes, or legal compulsion directly targeted at the physical user. Users requiring defense against provider webmail origins MUST use a native client or independently hosted web client.
EVH returns standardized machine-readable JSON error responses across all protocol endpoints.
| Error Code String | HTTP Status | Retryable | Description & Technical Trigger |
|---|